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The Warsaw Uprising is a story of several thousand Poles who, once again, 
refused to accept the fate of Poland under occupation. It was ultimately their 
first and last military effort for independence.(1) Those who have studied the 
factors surrounding the Uprising of 1944 have established their own theories 
explaining the occurrence. Joanna Hanson, who wrote The Civilian 
Population and the Warsaw Uprising, says that the rising was bound to 
occur as a result of living conditions. Norman Davies, who has written God's 
Playground: A History of Poland, says that the Warsaw Uprising was heroic 
but a mistake; that it was premature. Some, on the other hand, claim that the 
Poles would have won if they were provided with Allied reinforcements and 
that the uprising was not only heroic but also reasonable and sustainable. 
Zawodny, who has written Nothing but Honour: The Story of the Warsaw 
Uprising, a comprehensive study on the subject, strongly believes this. In the 
years following the war many historians tried to analyze what happened in 
Warsaw and why, yet none of them seem to agree. Each one comes to their 
own conclusion. None able to agree on one analysis of the interpretation. In 
order to understand the uprising one must first know the events that led up to 
it.
Poland had been struggling for independence for hundreds of years. 
Moreover, because of Poland's geographical location it is in my opinion that 
Poland will be defending her boundaries indefinitely. The country, located 
between two rival greatpowers Germany and Russia - was in the last century 
considered to be a buffer state. In the 18th century it had been a battleground 
for Russia, Prussia and Austria who took advantage of its weaknesses and 
divided the territory through three partitions. Yet, during its time of sorrow 
the Poles had organized themselves and raised their arms fighting heroically, 
often empty handed. It was this heroism in the time of need that allowed 
Poland to stay on the map for the century. On November 11, 1918, Poland 
once again became autonomous. Unfortunately, the times of bliss did not last 
very long. Twenty years later, Poland was invaded by Germany and, while 
fighting on the western front, seventeen days into the battle, the country was 
stabbed in tile back by the other powerful neighbor. On September 17, 1939 
Poland was on the way to its fourth partition.
World War II began on September 1, 1939 at approximately 4:40 am. First, a 
German battleship, the Schleswig Holstein, stationed in the Danzig port on a 
friendly visit, began firing on a Polish fort. Then, one hour later, the 
Wehrmacht entered Poland by land and air from the west. On September 17, 
while the Polish Army was still fighting, the Soviet Army entered Poland 
from the east, claiming that Poland was defeated and it was Russian 
responsibility to defend Lithuania and the Soviet Union from tile German 
onslaught.
The desperate battle for Poland at the outbreak of World War 11 did not last 
long. The Polish Army was crushed in the last days of September and the 
beginning of October in 1939. After the defeat of the Polish Army, 
underground resistance flourished.(2) It became stronger as the German 
forces were placed under increasing pressure by the advancing Soviets 
during the summer of 1943. The objective, after the Soviet Union became an 
ally in the war, was to systematically re-establish self government that was 
lost in the September 1939 campaign.
Small military offensives were sparked by optimism and heightened morale 
among the Polish resistance as well as by the pressure on the resistance by 
the civilian population. Weapons and ammunition were stored in basements 
and surrounding forests. This activity was closely monitored by the Polish 
Government in Exile in London. The Poles sabotaged the Germans 
numerous times, but it was not until the summer of 1944, that the Polish 
underground army made a full scale effort to regain control of their capital.
The largest and primary resistance movement in Poland during the latter part 
of World War 11 was organized by the Armia Krajowa (AK), also known as 
the Polish Home Army. Most of these fighters were officers and soldiers 
from the old Polish Army which was defeated at the end of September 1939. 
In addition to the old file and rank, many Polish citizens decided to join the 
resistance. Men between the ages of 16 through 60 years of age participated 
in actual combat and sabotage activities. Furthermore, those who were too 
young to fight or were handicapped participated in other ways than combat. 
For example, children, both boys and girls, would deliver the mail to 
civilians or act as secret couriers between military headquarters and the 
combatants. Those men and women who worked in German factories would 
steal supplies and equipment which was used to make grenades. According 
to Tuvia Borzykowski, who participated in both the Ghetto Uprising of 1943 
and the Warsaw Uprising of 1944, ... the civilian population became 
intensely involved, In every part of the city taken over by the insurgents the 
houses were decorated with Polish flags and civilians walked the streets with 
radiant faces, encouraging the fighters. Old and young were out in the streets 
heedless of bullets, enjoying the sight of the flags and the green uniforms of 
Polish soldiers. Women came out of their houses carrying food and drink for 
the fighting men, Young women became nurses, endangering their lives on 
the barricades. Even children became involved. 11 and 12 year olds acted as 
messengers and distributors of underground newspapers.(3)
The AK was formed from various political and ethnic groups. Many Jews 
collaborated with the AK. In 1942 the Poles established the Council of 
Assistance for Jews (RPZ) which saved approximately 100,00 Jews from the 
German death machine.(4) The Jews had lost much of their population to 
concentration camps in the previous years of the war and the Ghetto 
Uprising of 1943, but, nevertheless, the Jewish people who remained free 
did not give up hope and fought along side the poles.(5) Borzykowski who 
fought in the Jewish Fighting Organization in the Old City said in his 
memoirs, "The chief command of the People's Army cordially welcomed the 
founding of a Jewish fighting unit and we were immediately granted all 
privileges such as quarters, food rations etc."(6)
In 1942 the AK was joined by the Peasant Battalion (Bch) originally 
established to oppose the deportation and pacification program lead by 
Germany. In the summer of 1944 two additional right-wing groups joined 
the Home Army. They included the National Armed Forces (NSZ) and the 
National Military Organization (NOW). When referring to the AK during 
the Warsaw Uprising one is really referring to all of these groups fighting 
under one coherent command. Combined, they formed the single largest 
resistance group in Europe at the time - approximately 400,000 
participant.(7)
The conditions of the civilian population was one factor which pressured the 
resistance groups to act. Ever since the 1939 occupation of Poland by 
Germany, living conditions for the Poles drastically declined. The German 
Governor, Ludwig Fischer, implemented what many Poles called a reign of 
terror. There was to be no display of Polish culture; Polish schools were 
closed. Children had to be sent to German controlled schools where many 
were taught from books on nature as opposed to history, Polish language or 
culture. Many parents refused to send their children to school as a result. 
Polish books, dictionaries, newspapers, flags and maps were burned, and 
libraries closed. Theaters catered to German citizens. The repertory of those 
that admitted Poles was filled with German propaganda.(8)
Working conditions for Poles were devastating. Poles were hired as factory 
workers but were not allowed to hold any managerial positions. Their pay 
was close to nothing --- approximately six - ten zloty a day for a factory job 
during a time when feeding a family of four cost 1,568 zloty a month.(9) 
Many Poles did not work at all. As the war progresses money lost its value. 
Miron Bialoszewski who was in Warsaw during the war and the Uprising 
said, "Bartering sprang up ... From day to day ... a huge crowd. Standing. 
Milling about ... Practically everyone held something in his hand. Anything. 
Anything could be exchanged, as long as it wasn't for money. Money was 
worth as much as garbage."(10) There was a shortage of housing. Many 
buildings were destroyed during the German bombardment in 1939. If 
housing was available, several families had to share living quarters. Two to 
four families would live in one room. It was even worse during winter. The 
bombing raids had knocked out most of the windows, There was no heating 
when the temperature in January of 1940 fluctuated between -20' and -30' 
Celsius. Families would create a campfire in a single room from furniture 
they found in abandoned buildings. Others would live in crowded cellars 
under the city where it was safe from the bombing raids.(11)
Food supplies were rationed. Poles in Warsaw were allowed approximately 
half of a portion of bread that a German citizen was. Four hundred grams of 
meat was allowed for the Pole when a German was provided with 4,000
grams. Beer, wine, cigarettes, and cheese were denied completely. While 
food was sold on the black market, prices were high. In addition, any 
German raid which resulted in food confiscation raised the price as much as 
50%. None-the-less the black market bridged the gap between death and 
survival.(12) Furthermore, clothing was too expensive to buy. A pair of 
shoes in 1941 cost 600 - 700 Zloty. In 1942 only 100,000 pairs of shoes 
were offered for sale for a population of over one million people living in 
Warsaw.(13)
The Soviets also established various political groups within Poland. These 
were not formed as military resistance groups. Russia already had their own 
military and a Polish Army under Soviet command. There also existed a 
Polish Communist military group within Warsaw which was not under the 
direct control of the Soviets. They were called the Armia Ludowa (AL) or 
the Peoples Army with approximately 10,000 participants. This group hoped 
to assist the Red Army as they entered Warsaw. This group was much 
smaller and less influential than the AK Ultimately they joined with the AK 
in the uprising against the Germans. The communist Polska Partia 
Robotnicza (PPR) also known as the Polish Worker's Party was organized in 
1942 with the aid of Russia although there already existed a communist 
party in Poland before the war. The Zwiazek Patriotow Polskich (ZPP), also 
known as the Union of Polish Patriots, was established in 1943. This party 
was established in Russia and served to organize and unite the Poles within 
Russia as a military and political group, after Stalin announced in 1943 that 
anyone in Russia in November 1939 was regarded as a citizen of Russia. 
Willie before the war the communists were a minority group within Poland, 
after the war this party served as the puppet government. Finally, after the 
Uprising broke out, on July 22, 1944 the Soviets established the Polish 
Committee of National Liberation (PKWN) to administer the liberated 
territories of Poland.(14)
The Committee of National Liberation was probably the most influential of 
all communist parties at the time. They claimed to be the legal government 
of Poland at the end of World War II and, after the war, helped establish the 
puppet communist government within Poland until it fell apart in the 1980's.
Gabriel Kolko, a historian, who had written Century of War believes that 
Polish resistance during World War I as enigmatic; that the underground was 
a substitute for Polish society and that most joined this underground to 
survive rather than resist.(15) Perhaps it is true that the underground was 
Polish society at the time but it is incorrect to say that it was a substitute. 
After all everything about the underground was Polish, including the 
majority of the people, the language, culture, and food. It would be more 
appropriate to refer to the Germans who occupied Poland as a substitute 
Polish society. After all they came, by force, to replace the existing society 
within Poland - to substitute for that society. Because the Germans were 
unsuccessful at replacing the Poles, the underground at the time was the true 
Polish society.
Furthermore, when an individual or a force uses violence against an enemy 
and that violence is justified and supported by the United States, England, 
and Russia, one ought not call it survival but resistance. Stealing food and 
clothing from tile Germans may be survival but in the larger picture, the 
combined events which transpired between August 1, 1944 and October 2, 
1944 was a full fledged uprising - a resistance movement as opposed to 
survival.
The Warsaw Uprising was the ultimate result of a military operation code 
named "Burza," also known as the "Tempest." Originally it was 
implemented as a strategy to liberate Eastern Poland by fighting the 
Germans in the rural areas. The plan was to move westward and fight the 
German rear-guard as the Soviets pressured them to withdraw. As the 
Soviets arrived the AK was to cease fighting. The goal here was to 
successfully drive the Germans out and assume political control city by city. 
In order to gain an upper hand politically the Polish AK needed to 
participate by fighting the Germans before the Red Army could assume 
control. Operation "Tempest" was, therefore, "directed militarily against tile 
Germans and politically against the Russians."(16)
The military resistance against the Germans was clear. They had violated 
Polish sovereignty and occupied Poland. As a result Polish resistance was 
aimed at driving them out. It was an act of self defense which was justified 
by German hostility and treatment of the Polish population. The AK
The political offensive against Russia was of equal importance to the Poles, 
yet it was staged at a different level. Both Poland and Russia had their 
differences and knew that having a common enemy did not guarantee a 
relationship. On the contrary, Poland was distrustful of Russia and the 
Russians of those Poles who had any responsibility during the war. They 
were attacked by the Soviets at the outbreak of World War 11. Secondly 
they witnessed Stalin's brutality in the Katyn forest massacre in April 1943, 
where 4,321 Polish officers were found dead on land which was, at that time, 
occupied by Russia. Each of these officers was found with their hands tied 
behind their back and shot in the back of the head, execution style. 
Furthermore, 11,000 additional officers were missing, never to be found 
again. Likewise the Russians were distrustful of the Poles. They considered 
Poland "the monstrous bastard of the peace of Versailles," as Molotov had 
once said. Stalin referred to Poland as "Pardon the expression, a state." The 
hostility between these two states existed for over 500 years and sure enough 
it was not about to end now. As a result the negligent and hostile behavior of 
the Russians frightened many Polish leaders. There was the constant fear 
that the Soviets might want to set up Poland as a puppet communist state. 
There was a further question of Lithuanian territories and to whom they 
actually belonged. This was enough to convince the Polish resistance to gain 
political control over individual cities before the Soviets were able to 
implement Russian political control.
The Tempest was executed with mixed results. The Polish Home Army often 
fought the Germans, driving them further west. Sometimes they fought 
alongside the Red Army only to be ambushed by them after providing 
assistance. Each time the AK would occupy a town or city, the Red Army 
would arrive and replace the AK command with Polish communists loyal to 
the Soviets. The Red Army, after receiving military help from the Poles, 
would round up the insurgents and place them under arrest. Some of those 
arrested would then be sent to the Soviet Union, others would be shot. 
Furthermore, if Poland refused to fight alongside the Red Army then Russia
had a pretext to execute the Polish leaders - Poland was not fighting because 
it was pro-German. This would give Stalin a reason to take Poland without 
threatening allied relations. Moreover, it turns out that the AK fought for 
Eastern Poland unaware that the eastern territories were already ceded to 
Russia. On December 1, 1943, at the Teheran Conference, Eastern Poland 
was taken by tile Russians in an agreement between Stalin, Churchill and 
Roosevelt.(17) Yet, theBritish insisted that there should be a mutual 
understanding between the Poles and Russians.
Although many claim that the Conference at Teheran was a secret and that 
the result was a great shock and a stab in the back, I tend to disagree. The 
Tehran Conference was not a secret to tile diplomats from the Polish 
Government in Exile. It was only a secret to the general public and Warsaw 
headquarters. Prime Minister of Poland, Mikolajczyk, was aware of the 
meeting and he explained to British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, 
Poland's position regarding frontiers. He was aware that Russia claimed the 
eastern territories of Poland, including Lithuania. Furthermore, Mikolajczyk 
was aware of the concessions he had to make in eastern Poland for the sake 
of Russo-Polish relations. Certainly he would have preferred if the borders 
remained as they had been before the war in 1939. He told Eden that any 
discussions of Polish frontiers should include Poland's claim to the West, 
including rich German territory. Eden asked Mikolajczyk if he may address 
Poland's frontier problems at Tehran. Mikolajczyk agreed. Roosevelt, on the 
other hand, was not concerned so much with the frontier problem of Poland 
as lie was about Russo-Polish relations. His elections were approaching and 
he did not want to lose Polish votes. He was therefore willing to compromise 
Poland's eastern frontier considering approximately an equal amount of land 
was gained in the west. In fact, during the conference Roosevelt asked Stalin 
if Poland would be proportionally compensated in tile west. Stalin answered 
that lie did not know. Apparently Roosevelt was satisfied with this answer 
but he showed some concern for Poland.(18) Churchill, on the other hand, 
demanded a concrete answer. He insisted that Poland be compensated for the 
land it gave up. Furthermore, arrangements were made with Stalin to have 
the Polish population east of the Curzon line transferred within the Polish 
boundaries.(19)
At first Stalin wanted the Molotov-Ribbentrop line, which was the dividing 
line within Poland between Germany and Russia after Poland's defeat in 
1939, to serve as the border between Poland and Russia. After realizing that 
it was impossible to compensate Poland under this proposal, Russia was 
persuaded to accept the Curzon Line, which was first proposed by the British 
in 1920 based on ethnic factors. The line was drawn to divide the Poles from 
the Lithuanians in response to the Russo-Polish dispute during the Bolshevik 
Revolution. In return Poland received 150 miles of German territory in the 
west, Eastern Prussia and the territories of Upper Silesia. When Mikolajczyk 
learned of the agreement he expressed his opposition. But the disagreement 
did not revolve around all of the ceded territories. In fact, Mikolajczyk was 
willing to make amends to the boundaries. The disagreement was regarding 
two important cities with large Polish populations on the border of the 
Curzon line, these were Lwow and Wilno. Under the agreement they would 
be ceded to Russia. When his request for the two cities was refused he asked 
for additional land from Germany but this request was also denied. It was 
consequently settled at the frontiers originally agreed upon at the Tehran 
Conference. Under this agreement Poland was not compensated 
proportionally. The territory that it lost to Russia amounted to 178,220 km2 
and it gained 10 1,200 km2 , but the gains were far superior to the losses. 
The German and Prussian territories were rich in coal and iron deposits 
while Lithuanian land was used as farmland and held no substantial 
resources. Not only did this benefit the Poles but the plan would also deprive 
Germany of valuable industrial resources for tile future of the German 
military after tile war.
Despite the disagreement, the headquarters in Warsaw were not notified of 
the border arrangements and as a consequence did not tailor their military 
plans to tile change in territory. As a result many insurgents were left 
fighting the Germans on Russian land. Unfortunately, at that time the 
Soviets did not recognize the AK as a combatant group and did not treat 
them as prisoners of war. Instead many insurgent soldiers caught fighting the 
Germans on Russian land were shot. Consequently, the relations between tile 
Soviet military and the Polish Home Army may have been strained as a 
result of Mikolajczyk's negligence to inform the insurgents of border 
changes. It was, after all, his responsibility to inform the insurgents of any 
diplomatic decisions which might affect their fighting. Unfortunately, 
Mikolajczyk gave everyone the impression that relations were progressing. 
In fact after a conference on August 3, 1944, between Mikolajczyk and 
Molotov, the New York Times declared that "cooperation [between Poland 
and Russia] so far is 'quite satisfactory.'"(20) In my opinion Tempest should 
have ceased in the annexed territories until further negotiations were settled. 
This would have saved many lives and possibly strengthened relations 
between Polish and Soviet troops.
Although operation Tempest was designed to take place in the rural parts of 
Poland, and preparations reflected this goal, the evolving events pressed for 
military action in the city of Warsaw. On July 21, 1944, the Commander of 
the AK, General Bor-Komorowski met with his chief of Staff, Brigadier 
General Tadeusz Pelczynski and his second in command, General Leopold 
Okulicki. They came to a conclusion that the time had come to rise against 
the Germans who at that time were apparently removing their forces from 
Warsaw in the face of the oncoming Russian Army. Stanislaw Jankowski, 
Delegate and Vice-Prime Minister of the legal Polish Government who was, 
at the time, the senior authority in Warsaw, gave his approval .(21)
Observing the many wounded and dead German soldiers being evacuated 
from the city it was expected that the Red Army will take over within days. 
But because the Polish leaders wanted to show to the west that it was 
through their efforts and not the Russian's that Warsaw was liberated, they 
felt obliged to act immediately. On July 25 General Bor reported to London 
that the AK stood by ready to pick up their weapons. That same day the 
Government in Exile authorized Jankowski to make any decisions 
necessitated by the speed of the Soviet offensive, without any further 
communication with London. Prime Minister Mikolajczyk made this
decision concrete by sending a telegram on July 26 to the delegate which 
authorized him to "announce the beginning of the uprising at the moment 
chosen by you." The Prime Minister, who was just getting ready to go to 
Moscow to discuss with Stalin the matters of the border and the future shape 
of Poland, wanted to have a strong argument - the military uprising for 
independence - to reinforce his position.(22)
The following day, Ambassador to Great Britan Edward Raczynski paid a 
visit to British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and informed him about the 
plans for the uprising. He suggested that a brigade of paratroopers be sent to 
Warsaw, that the German Royal Air Force around Warsaw be bombed, that 
long-range fighter planes be given to the disposition of tile AK, and lastly 
that it be announced that the AK holds combatant rights. Eden promised to 
consider these ideas. Shortly after, Raczynski received a letter from Sir 
Orme Sargent of the British Foreign Office stating that Britain lacked the 
technical capabilities to assist Poland and "therefore, there is nothing that 
His Majesty's Government can do in this conexion...."(23) Meanwhile, a 
Polish paratroops brigade stood by ready to go to Warsaw. Again England 
refused to transport them because according to British Field Marshall Alan 
F. Brooke, "Large numbers of transport aircraft would be required for this 
purpose, and these could not be spared at this critical stage of the campaign 
in the west ."(24) While the Polish paratroops brigade refused to eat in 
protest, no one troubled to inform General Bor, even after the rising began, 
that assistance was not coming. It seems that vital information was withheld 
often from the AK Not only was the Home Army already fighting on Soviet 
land without knowing it, now they were about to engage in a full scale 
uprising under the impression that aid was on its way. With the proper 
information the AK command could have conformed their decisions 
regarding the time and place of the uprising.
The fact that they did not receive combatant rights did not impede their 
resistance efforts. Combatant rights would not have led to victory. But it did 
mean that many insurgent lives were lost unnecessarily as a result. The 
allies, when making the decision not to grant combatant rights, may have 
thought that a combined and coordinated effort among the Poles and 
Russians would have meant an easier victory. This was, in fact, what 
England wanted - cooperation among the two. The mentality of the Polish 
and Russian governments, and the fact that each had conflicting national 
interests, did not allow for a close relationship. While combatant rights 
would have forced the enemy to take prisoners, refusing combatant rights 
resulted in the execution of many armed Poles within and outside of 
Warsaw. It was not until August 2, 1944 after the uprising had begun, that 
England announced that the insurgents had combatant rights. This was in 
response to the Germans who were using Polish prisoners and civilians as 
shields in front of their tanks and infantry.(25) Regardless, the Germans did 
not follow the rules of war and continued to shield their military with Polish 
civilians and insurgents. It was not until October 2, 1944 that Poles were 
granted combatant rights by Germany, and this was conditional on the 
surrender of the AK.
The decision for the uprising was maturing in the midst a lot of tension. The 
leadership of underground Poland knew that a premature Uprising would 
allow the Germans to crush it while a late one would deprive the legal 
government in London of influence over the course of action.
One incident which precipitated the uprising was the Communist call for 
arms. Just before the uprising Communist radio made several broadcasts. On 
April 29, the Moscow Radio in a Polish edition called for Poles to "Raise up 
arms! There is no time to be lost." The following day another message was 
transmitted. It said "Let the millions of Warsowians become a million 
soldiers who will force away the German occupant and win their liberty." On 
July 30, the Polish Workers' Party spread this propaganda, "Warsowians, 
raise up arms. Alert the whole city and every neighborhood. Raise up 
militarily."(26) These messages and others were transmitted over five times 
a day just prior to the Rising. The Communist PPR also tried to stir tensions 
by announcing that the leadership of the AK ran away from Warsaw, when 
in fact they remained in the city. Communist propaganda also called for the 
Polish people to assist the PPR in their rising against the Germans. This 
proclamation was written all over the walls of Warsaw and may have 
prematurely alerted the Germans of the uprising.(27) In a situation where a 
large proportion of the inhabitants of the capital were eager to fight there 
existed a danger that the spontaneous military operation of the communists 
would create an uprising under their leadership. This was additional pressure 
for the AK command.
The Germans wanted to avoid an uprising, but their methods of trying to 
silence the possible insurgents placed the AK under a lot of tension. The 
Germans, who already knew that an uprising was to take place as early as 
the 25th of July, began to take precautions and doubled their patrols. Night 
curfews were more stringently enforced. It was common for German patrols 
to round up the men, shoot them on the spot or possibly deport them to 
concentration camps. Furthermore, the Germans hung posters around the 
city asking for one hundred thousand able bodied men for labor putting up 
fortifications against the advancing Red Army. The Germans were 
unsuccessful at gathering these men. These able bodied men were apparently 
more willing to fight against the Germans than help them. Possibly many of 
them knew that it was just an easy way to gather and detain the Polish 
people who were of age and physical strength to fight. In addition, tile AK 
was afraid that the Germans would uncover their weapon caches which were 
being prepared in the basements of ruined buildings.
This fear was perpetuated when German officials uncovered 70,000 
grenades and 450 flame throwers that were to be used by the insurgents 
hidden in basements of abandoned buildings.(28) The basements were then 
flooded and many men died. The AK feared that the Germans might uncover 
more of their weapons, and they had very few to spare. Lastly, the AK 
command was informed on July 30 that four German tank divisions were 
approaching Warsaw. These were to be used against the advancing Red 
Army and could have easily been used against the insurgents.(29) This 
constant pressure called for an uprising to be staged as soon as possible.
In the morning of July 30 the chief commander of the AK, General Bor, met 
with the Rada Jednosci Narodowej (RJN) also known as the Committee for 
National Unity which wanted to join in an alliance with Britain, France and 
the United States. This committee was made up of civilians and was separate 
form the AK but it cooperated with the Home Army. It was responsible for 
the consolidation of the civilian side of tile Polish Underground, the 
distribution of food and clothing, and in charge of maintaining some sort of 
order within the city. The Committee also wanted to maintain good relations 
with the Soviet Union as long as the Soviets did not interfere with the 
internal affairs of Poland. In addition, they wanted to establish a centralized 
constitutional democracy, an apolitical army and equal rights for minorities. 
At the meeting General Bor related that the Red Army was spotted in 
Grochow, a suburb of Warsaw. That same day, at six o'clock in the 
afternoon, Colonel Monter-Chrusciel reported that Russian tanks were 
spotted in Praga, another suburb of Warsaw. A courier who was in Warsaw 
at this time reported that "the speed of the Russian advance had caused the 
Germans to hasten their slaughter of Hungarian Jews and Poles," which was 
yet another factor which precipitated the uprising.(30) It was then decided 
that the Warsaw Uprising would start on August I at five o'clock in the 
afternoon, also known as "W" hour.(31)
On August 1, 1944 at five o'clock in the afternoon, in the streets of Warsaw, 
the AK began an Uprising against the German occupants. The battle lasted 
for sixty three days. During these sixty three days Warsaw was destroyed 
systematically while the inhabitants were murdered one by one. Fires and 
explosions were everywhere. "The thick clouds of smoke were over the 
capital as if they wanted to cover up the inequality of the fighting 
underneath."(32) The AK had few guns and little ammunition. The citizens 
living without water, gas and electricity, feeding upon rotten wheat, also 
stood up to tile Germans. With their empty hands young men, women and 
children rose against tanks and guns, Their motto was "Whoever wins will 
be free, whoever dies is free already."(33) After sixty three days Warsaw 
fell.
In the Warsaw Uprising over 200,000 people were killed and thousands 
more removed to German concentration camps during their fight for 
freedom. Those who survived had nothing left. Their city was turned into 
ruins.
Many will say that the Warsaw Uprising was premature and that is why it 
failed. This is inaccurate. The uprising was not premature. The approaching 
Red Army signified hope for the Warsowians. Fighting in the rear ranks of 
the retreating German Army meant an easier victory than fighting them 
directly during the occupation. The unbearable living conditions and 
constant oppression by German officials placed the civilian population 
pleading and demanding help from the AK and the Polish government. All 
of these factors preceding the uprising are clear examples that the uprising 
was bound to occur. Others say that the uprising was premature because the 
insurgents were ill equipped and did not posses a strict chain of command 
which meant that it was difficult to coordinate the resistance effort. This is 
true; the AK was organized from separate insurgent groups fighting under 
the title of AK, and they were not equipped to take on the Germans alone, 
but at the time of the uprising, the AK had more weapons and ammunition 
than it ever had at any time during the war. In addition at the time of the 
uprising the AK was as well unified as it ever was. It contained one of the 
largest unified resistance groups in Europe. Furthermore, the New York 
times on August 3, 1944 wrote that, "Warsaw and even Germans themselves 
do not believe liberation is far off."(34) The AK could not wait any longer. 
Waiting would not bring them more weapons nor any more soldiers. In fact 
their numbers were ever so slowly diminishing due to the German 
executions and concentration camps. In addition, their weapon and 
ammunition garrisons were under the threat of discovery. Waiting was 
nothing more than passively accepting one's own death. The uprising was 
bound to occur. Its failure is attributed to several different reasons.
To begin with, the AK was anticipating a quick victory unaware of the full 
strength of the Germans in Warsaw. The AK was severely deficient in 
equipment and tactics compared to the Germans. The AK possessed only 
those weapons they had saved from the 1939 defeat, those weapons which 
they stole and those which they bought from avaricious Germans.(35) A 
large portion of their weapons was stored outside of Warsaw to be used in 
other parts of Poland. These weapons would never reach Warsaw after the 
Uprising began because it was almost impossible to cross the Wisla in large 
numbers without being seen. According to several members of the AK 
Headquarters the available equipment consisted of the following:
1,000 carbines 
300 pistols 
60 light machine guns 
7 heavy machine guns 
35 special carbines and bazookas 
1,700 revolvers 
25,000 hand-grenades 
The number of soldiers actually fighting for the AK within Warsaw was 
estimated between 36,000 and 40,000 which would allow approximately 10 
percent of the force to be armed at one time. Tile need for ammunition was 
even more desperate. On August 1, 1944 the following was available:
35 bullets to a pistol
300 bullets for a machine pistol
50 shells for anti-armour cannon (but not even one cannon)
190 pieces of ammunition per carbine
500 round of ammunition for a light machine gun 
2,300 rounds for the heavy machine guns(36)
Due to this scarcity every piece of ammunition was cherished dearly. A 
poster circulated among the Polish resistance fighters, illustrated a skeleton 
wearing a German helmet. Underneath it read "For every German, one 
bullet." These posters were intended to be taken seriously. Wasting 
ammunition would have meant punishment and possible confiscation of the 
weapon and ammunition. To save ammunition, bricks were dropped onto 
patrolling SS men, and stones were used to bludgeon any German who was 
unfortunate enough to be caught with his guard down. Hand-made grenades, 
constructed of nuts and bolts wrapped in socks were used, but were often too 
bulky to throw. Cocktail bombs were also used when hand-grenades ran out. 
Their ingenuity was boundless; unfortunately they needed more than just 
creativity and strong will to win a battle. They needed weapons and 
ammunition that would match those of the Germans. One just can not fight a 
tank with sticks and stones, as some people did. Overall the insurgents had 
enough ammunition to last for only three days. The New York Times on 
August 4, 1944 claimed that "the underground forces could not reduce the 
German fortifications because of the scarcity of weapons, especially heavy 
ones."(37) Ninety percent of the soldiers were therefore treated as reserves.
The insurgents were also deficient tactically. Because of tile difficulty with 
communication, it was hard to coordinate the whole effort. In fact, due to 
misunderstanding, deep enthusiasm and insufficient lines of communication 
(meaning the sewers), some insurgents began firing on the Germans as early 
as 1:30 in tile afternoon on August 1, 1944. During the first few days of the 
fighting the AK was fighting in groups that were too small to take any 
important German strongpoints. By the time the AK had realized their 
errors, the Germans were able to coordinate their efforts toward fortifying 
strategic points such as bridges and airports. Instead of focusing their efforts 
on such strongpoints the forces were scattered around tile city and much of 
their energy went into fighting for each and every building and block 
regardless of importance. It seems that they focused too much on fighting 
the individual soldier when they should have been taking bridges, prisons, 
and important fortifications.(38) Another error may have been the reluctance 
to retreat. General Monter, who personally commanded the forces in the city 
of Warsaw, ordered that no man shall retreat even when the odds are greatly 
against them. I am sure that each man was willing to fight to the end, but I 
am not sure whether this is the right attitude to have when you have no 
weapons and you are outnumbered. General Monter was stubborn when it 
came to retreating and often General Bor himself had to order Monter to 
withdraw. This reluctance may have cost the AK many unnecessary 
casualties.
As I have already mentioned the British failed to provide military assistance 
to the AK, but they did attempt to provide air assistance by dropping 
supplies. Supplies were sent by British aircraft which took off from Britain, 
Italy and Africa. Both Polish and British airmen volunteered for these 
missions. While their efforts should be seen as heroic, the resistance that 
they faced prevented any meaningful assistance to reach tile insurgents. 
Many British pilots who flew over Warsaw were hesitant to go back 
complaining bitterly, "that Russians were actually firing on them."(39) They 
claimed that the barrage of artillery was coming from both the German and 
Russian sides of the front. Of course, in addition to them having to dodge 
friendly fire, the pilots had to avoid being shot down by the Germans. 
German artillery and guns showered any enemy planes that penetrated 
Warsaw airspace. German fighter planes threatened any bomber squadrons 
or supply planes which dared enter without air support. It was estimated that
approximately sixty percent of the aircraft sent to Warsaw did not return, 
while flights to other German occupied countries had no losses. Planes that 
did return were full of bullet holes. "Even parachutes inside the planes were 
riddled by German bullets or explosives."(40) The alternative was to land 
planes on Soviet occupied territory after making the airdrops which would 
allow for short range fighters to assist the supply missions. Unfortunately, 
Stalin forbade any allied planes from landing on Soviet soil and refused to 
make any air drops. Of the very few supplies that made it to Warsaw, 90 
percent of them fell into German hands. After one and a half months of 
fighting, and a lot pressure from the allied forces and growing publicity, the 
Soviets reluctantly agreed to make air drops into Warsaw. I do not suppose 
the Russians were too helpful when they decided to make the air drops but 
on September 14, when Russian planes suddenly appeared over Warsaw 
with them came a hail of crashing containers. Their parachutes failed to 
open.(41) The insufficient air support was, therefore, another reason why the 
Uprising failed.
Some claim that the English were responsible for providing the Poles with 
military assistance in the event of an invasion as was stipulated in the 
Versailles Treaty. They did just that in 1939 when Poland was invaded by 
Germany. The conditions were different in 1944 when the Poles decided to 
stage an uprising. First of all, Poland was not invaded in 1944, it was already 
occupied by the Germans. Technically, Poland did not exist. Certainly 
Russians were "opposed to the Polish London Government which is 
acknowledged by the underground." Secondly, the British did attempt to 
provide aid to those insurgents who remained united under the AK by 
dropping supplies whenever it was possible. Unfortunately it was not enough 
to fulfill the insurgent's needs. The fact that they did not allow the Polish 
paratroops brigade to invade Warsaw might have meant that England was 
concerned about the lives of those troops. After all, if an airplane dropping 
supplies returns riddled with bullets, what are the chances of several 
thousand soldiers trying to jump out of these planes into streams of artillery 
fire? They would be sitting ducks. Their chances of making it may have been 
minimal if any. Lastly, I believe the allied western front was a reasonable 
attempt at providing aid to the Poles. Tile purpose was to defeat Germany as 
a whole and provide independence to France, Belgium, Poland, among a few 
nations occupied by Germany, not just to liberate the Warsowians from 
German occupation.
Finally, many Poles blame the failure of the uprising on tile Russians. After 
the Tehran Conference Russo-Polish relations were believed to be improved. 
The AK on the eve of the uprising was aware that the Soviet Army was 
approaching Warsaw. They expected them to enter anywhere between 
August 1st and August 4th. Unfortunately, the Soviets did not enter Warsaw 
until January 1945, five months later.
Many Polish historians say that the Russians purposely waited until the AK 
was suppressed so that they would be able to enter and take Warsaw for 
themselves. While the Soviets probably did want to take Warsaw, this was a 
secondary objective. Their first objective was to drive the Germans as far 
west as possible and occupy as much Polish and German territory as they 
could in a short period of time. Therefore, it was an inconvenience for them 
to stop at the outskirts of Warsaw to wait for three months if they were 
physically able to advance.
The Russians claim that they were stopped by the German Army. By the 
time the Russians reached Warsaw the Germans had sent four extra tank 
divisions to stop the advancing Russians. General Heinz Guderian stated, 
"We Germans had the impression that it was our defenses that halted the 
enemy rather than a Russian desire to sabotage the Warsaw Uprising."(42) It 
was the perception of the Russians that a military halt would allow the 
United States and England to seize the bulk of German territory. The Soviet 
gains would then depend upon the location of the Russian Army at the end 
of the war.
The Warsaw Uprising fell short of its goal. But the blame can not be focused 
on any one nation or group of people. The blame falls on everyone. 
Roosevelt could have taken more time and influence to negotiate the future 
boundaries of Poland instead of depending on the UN to settle the Polish 
question. The English, who would not take a stand on most issues without 
the approval of the United States, could have taken a firmer stand against 
Russian Diplomacy. The Polish government in London also failed to provide 
the AK with pertinent information. Because the main concern was weapons, 
ammunition and possibly ground support the Soviets would not have 
provided these due to their objective to take Warsaw. They opposed the 
Polish government in exile and they wanted to occupy as much territory as 
possible. They could not have accomplished this if they collaborated with 
the AK It was foolish to think that the Soviets would have provided the 
Poles with guns and ammunition which later could have been used against 
them. This is one reason why the Russians failed to recognize the AK as a 
combatant group. Independent national interest ultimately led to the failure 
of the Warsaw Uprising.
Moreover, I believe the Uprising was worthwhile, no matter that it failed. 
Unfortunately many people died during this rising, but many people would 
have died without the uprising. Some may ask, why not wait for the Soviets 
to liberate Poland? The answer is simple. Russia invaded Poland in 1939. 
They were hostile to them throughout the war killing tens of thousands of 
Polish officers. Only when Germany attacked Russia in 1941 did the Soviets 
look at Poland as an ally. After Germany was no longer a threat to Russia, 
Stalin once again began eliminating Polish resistance. The question should 
be why was the Polish government so naive as to depend so much on Stalin's 
Army? Under Soviet liberation Poland was allowed to keep its name but its 
soul was stolen from them.
The Uprising was worthwhile because it established Polish identity in a time 
when Poland was practically wiped off the map. Peaceful negotiations 
obviously did not accomplish the desired results, Resistance was the only 
option opened to the Poles. They wanted independence as they have always 
wanted it in the past and no one was able to give it to them or even help 
them achieve it. Poland gained its independence after World War I through 
the Treaty of Versaille. After World War 11, Poland was not afforded this 
luxury. I believe the resistance movement and every other act of 
independence throughout history, on the part of the Polish nation is an 
example that Poland exists and will always exist in body, mind and spirit. 
And it is in my opinion that these acts of resistance led to the liberation of 
Poland in the 1980's.
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